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The paper analyzes how the debate on intrinsic motivation was imported from psychology into 
economics. The most important differences between the two disciplines are in the definition of intrinsic 
motivation and in the timing of the undermining effect of rewards. The economic framework of inter-
temporal choices is proposed to reconcile the different empirical and theoretical results arising in the 
literature, and it is shown how rewards induce substitution and income effects depending on whether 
they are transitory or permanent. Furthermore, a distinction between input and output oriented intrinsic 
motivation is introduced.  
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In psychology, motivation is defined as a dynamic factor that directs behaviour 
toward an objective. According to Geen (1994), motivation refers to the initiation, 
direction, intensity and persistence of human behaviour. Extrinsic motivation operates 
when someone engages in a particular behaviour for purposes that are extrinsic to the 
behaviour itself, such as to receive praise, awards, good reviews or to avoid 
unpleasant situations or punishments. In Deci et al. (2008), behaviour motivated by 
extrinsic motivation ‘entails doing an activity because it leads to some outcome that is 
operationally separable from the activity itself. That is, extrinsic motivation concerns 
activities enacted because they are instrumental rather than because one finds the 
actions satisfying in their own right’ (p. 12). Intrinsic motivation, instead, operates 
when someone engages in behaviour because he finds the activity challenging and 
rewarding in itself, and derives satisfaction in enhancing his competence in that 
specific task.  
Economics has devoted much attention to the role of incentives in economic 
relationships but, as early as 1971, Titmuss suggested that incentives for blood donors 
may have a countervailing effect. More recently, Frey (1992), importing from 
psychology the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, raised new 
interest in this topic, stressing that economists must be cautious in prescribing 
economic incentives, because of the unexpected effects of extrinsic incentives on 
intrinsic motivation.  
By contrast, Benabou and Tirole (2003) elaborated a model of informational signals 
to show that the perverse action of extrinsic rewards arises only in a specific setup of 
a principal-agent problem and that ‘before worrying about the negative impact of 
rewards, one should first check that the reward provider has private information about 
the task or the agent's talent’ (Benabou and Tirole, 2003, p.505). Their analysis is 
extended in Benabou and Tirole (2006) where the effects of social reputation are also 
considered. 
The crucial point in economic debate is whether and when economic incentives 
induce the desired performance, with two opposing positions: one invoking a strong 
role for intrinsic motivation in describing some anomalous effects of incentives, the 
other recalling the fundamental role of informational setup to explain why, in specific 
frameworks, the price signal sometimes shows unexpected effects. 
Economic theorists apply their instruments of analysis to the psychological distinction 
between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations, but the two disciplines pursue different 
objectives and the reasoning does not completely overlap. The most important 
divergence between economic analyses and psychological research emerges when the 
effects of expected rewards on individual performance are discussed. While 
psychologists are interested in the ‘evolution’ of the behaviour of an individual 
engaged in a freely chosen activity, economists, following a consolidated tradition of 
comparative statics analysis, search for the ‘simultaneous’ effect on behaviour (and 
performance) of a reward supplied in a previously non monetary relationship. The 
issue becomes pivotal when empirical results are discussed: most results of the 
psychological research show undermining effects after the reward removal, whereas 
economics usually models the effects of rewards during the reward supply.  
Psychology offers a large amount of empirical research on the effects of rewards on 
free-choice activities, well summarised in some meta-analytical studies (Deci et al., 
1999; Rummel and Feinberg, 1988; Wiersma, 1992; Tang and Hall, 1995; 
Eisenberger and Cameron, 1996; Cameron and Pierce, 1994), while data in the 
economic field are more recent and less consolidated. Therefore, it is not infrequent 
for economic theorists to refer their working hypothesis to the results of psychological 
research, explaining dynamic results in a static framework. This ambiguity in the 
relation between economic theory and psychological results has two limiting 
implications. First, economics implicitly assumes that the effects of incentives on 
intrinsic motivation and performance do not change whether the incentives are 
temporary or permanent. Second, according to the two opposing positions, the price 
effect of an external incentive is reduced to its signalling power or to its income effect 
on individual behavior, whereas any intertemporal substitution effect is disregarded.  
To reconcile economic theory with psychological research, the intertemporal 
substitution between the two periods of observation (during and post rewards) is 
considered. Substitution between two periods is relevant only for temporary policies 
(rewards), whereas for permanent policies only income effects can be predicted. The 
static economic analysis of the hidden costs of incentives implicitly assumes a 
permanent reward, whereas in psychology the rewards are often temporary. It can be 
shown that economic models are interested in the income effect induced by a 
permanent reward, during its supply; on the other hand, psychology investigates the 
intertemporal substitution effect of a temporary reward in the post reward period. 
Therefore, similarities and differences among results proposed by economists and 
psychologists can be explained by adopting an intertemporal framework. Moreover, 
when economics searches for the perverse effects of incentives, it cannot invoke 
empirical results from psychology, usually related to a substitution effect. Dealing 
with income effects, economic analyses should concentrate on whether the free choice 
activity is considered by individuals to be an inferior good.     
In the following section, some theoretical models on the role of intrinsic motivation in 
economic behaviour are discussed.  Section 3 takes a deeper look into the question of 
the timing of the crowding out of intrinsic motivation, explaining how different 
results can be interpreted in terms of intertemporal choices. Section 4 analyses the 
different definitions of intrinsic motivations and how these definitions can be 
classified as input or output oriented motivations (Section 5). To test the robustness of 
the intertemporal choice approach to intrinsic motivation and crowding out, some 
empirical economic analyses are discussed in Section 6. Concluding remarks are in 
Section 7.   
 
2. The economic models of intrinsic motivation 
 
The economic literature has devoted some attention to the effect of intrinsic 
motivation on the performance of workers and students, to study the crowding out 
effect of pecuniary incentives (extrinsic motivations). Two effects of increasing 
rewards were distinguished: a relative price effect, which increases the supply of 
effort in the activity by lowering the opportunity cost of doing it; a crowding effect, 
which may increase the agent’s performance (crowding in), or reduce the 
performance, if intervention undermines intrinsic motivation (crowding out) so much 
that the negative effect on performance is greater than the positive price effect (Frey 
and Goette, 1999). Both the relative price effect and the crowding effect are active, 
implying that the external intervention may be beneficial from the principal point of 
view depending on the relative size of the two countervailing effects. Frey and Jegen 
(2001) formalised the crowding out effect in the Motivation crowding theory, but did 
not explain why derivatives representing crowding effects could differ from one 
person to another and from one situation to another (Harvey, 2005).  
Many authors have stressed the relation between the crowding effect of rewards and 
the perceived control effect. Frey and Jegen (2001) identify two psychological 
processes that affect intrinsic motivations: impaired self determination and impaired 
self esteem. Benabou and Tyrole (2003) use the ‘looking glass self’ (Cooley, 1902) to 
show that an agent takes the principal’s perspective in order to learn about himself. 
For the authors, the incentives enhance engagement in an activity only if they reveal 
hidden information to the agent, about the task or the agent’s talent, enhancing his 
confidence in himself. In the model of prosocial behaviour (Benabou and Tirole, 
2006) rewards and punishments create doubt about the true motive for which good 
deeds are performed. In the signal-extraction problem, rewards crowd out reputational 
motivation, modifying the endogenous and unobservable mix of motivations 
(intrinsic, extrinsic and reputational) that is the source of pro social behaviour.   
While Frey refers explicitly to the cognitive evaluation theory of Deci (1971) and to 
the fundamental role of intrinsic motivation in human behaviour, the models of 
Benabou and Tirole use the attributional approach to include the overjustification 
effect. Benabou and Tirole do not consider the role of intrinsic motivation as a crucial 
point, because they “show how the ‘overjustifucation effect’… can be understood as a 
signal-extraction problem in which rewards amplify the noise, leading observers… to 
attribute less of a role to intrinsic motivation in explaining variations in behavior” 
(Benabou and Tirole, 2006, p. 1660).  
An asymmetric information framework also features in Sliwka model (2007), where 
the explanation of crowding out is explicitly ‘distinct from those proposed by 
psychologists’, and is based on the learning of the prevailing social norm, emerging 
from the incentive scheme proposed by the principal. In his model, asymmetric 
information is assumed about the type of agent and the distribution of types in the 
population, with selfish agents compared with fair agents, who care for the principal’s 
payoff, and conformist agents, who are alternatively selfish or fair, depending on how 
the majority of population behaves. Bolle and Otto (2010) assume a linear relation 
between individual utility and others’ utility. The intrinsic motivation towards the 
other’s welfare depends on the value of the good the other receives and not on the 
good itself: the individual estimation of this value is assumed higher than the signal 
he extract from the reward and crowding out could occur if the signal is too low. 
Most economic models are concerned with a backward shift of the standard supply 
curve, which predicts that effort increases with payments, or with a downward-
sloping supply that totally reverses the sign of the relation between effort and 
payments. The coherence of these results with the psychological predictions on the 
effect of rewards will be discussed in the following section.  
 
3. The timing of the crowding out 
 
The control effect of rewards on behaviour is demonstrated by the fact that “when 
administered closely subsequent to a behaviour, rewards were reliably found to 
increase the likelihood that the behaviour would be emitted again, an effect that 
persisted as long as the reward contingency was operative. When rewards were 
terminated, the likelihood that the behavior would be emitted eventually returned to 
the prereward baseline” (Deci et al., 1999, p. 627). The undermining effect of rewards 
has a further implication when  likelihoods following the reward removal are below 
the prereward baseline. 
From the empirical point of view, results of empirical tests on intrinsic motivation 
generally refer to the degree to which participants return and persist at the target 
activity during a free-choice period subsequent to the experimental phase (Deci, 
1971).  The persistence can be measured by the amount of time spent in the free 
choice activity or by the number of trials or successes with the target activity. The 
undermining effect appears when a postreward response rate is below the response 
rate of a no-rewards comparison group (Deci et al., 1999, p. 658). 
Most results from the psychological research show undermining effects after the 
reward removal, whereas during the reward supply a better performance can be 
found1.  The rationale for this is that, during the reward contingency, individual 
behaviour is the result of a mix of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Deci et al., 1999, 
                                                
1 Few exceptions can be found in psychological literature, as in Eisenstein (1985). 
p.635). When importing into economics the evidence of the undermining effects of 
rewards on intrinsic motivation, this timing is less clear. The traditional attitude for 
comparative statics in economics led to modelling the effects of rewards during the 
reward supply. It is worth noting that the terminologies used in economics and 
psychology are also different: the “undermining effect” in psychology becomes the 
“crowding out effect” in economics, the latter being the conventional expression for 
countervailing and simultaneous effects. In what follows, the different meaning of 
these terminologies will be maintained. 
In the words of Frey and Jegen (2001), an external reward, introduced in a previously 
non monetary relationship, produce two effects: the relative price effect occurs 
because external intervention (reward) raises performance by imposing a higher 
marginal cost of shirking, or increasing the marginal benefit of performing; and the 
crowding-out effect, which reduces the supply of effort by undermining the marginal 
utility deriving from the activity. As stated above, empirical psychological research 
stresses that, after the reward removal, a reduction in intrinsic motivation may be 
observed, under some specific circumstances. Both disciplines predict the same 
directions for each effect: intrinsic motivation enhances performance, rewards 
enhance performance, rewards (may) reduce intrinsic motivation, thereby reducing 
performance. The critical difference between the two disciplines is that psychology 
analyzes only the signs of the changes, measured after the reward removal, while 
economics is also interested in the size of the changes that occur during the reward 
supply. From this point of view, economic analysis focuses on a restrictive case of the 
undermining of intrinsic motivation. This occurs because economics is especially 
interested in the well functioning of economic incentives, and economic models try to 
predict under which circumstances the monetary incentive can be counterproductive.  
 
3.1 Transitory and permanent rewards 
A recent paper by Gneezy et al. (2011) addresses the problem of the timing of 
crowding out, distinguishing between crowding out when incentives are in place and 
crowding out after incentives are removed. To this they add the well-known 
distinction between short and long run, defining the first type of crowding out as a 
short run situation and the latter as a long run situation. However, these mixed 
definitions can be misleading because it is not clear if the short/long run definition is 
an attribution of the reward or of the effect induced by the reward. To clarify the 
short/long run attribution of policies and of their effects, a separate discussion of 
undermining effects and crowding out effects will be conducted in the following 
paragraphs. 
As to the undermining effect, the effect of reward is verified after the incentive is 
removed. Therefore, the reward is a transitory policy of the principal that can be 
labelled as short run policy. The undermining of intrinsic motivation is a permanent 
effect of this transitory policy that can be labelled as a long run effect, because it is in 
evidence after the reward removal but lasts from the period of reward supply until the 
period after reward removal onwards. The meta-analysis of Deci et al. (1999) 
supports this explanation when it explores explicitly the problem of the duration of 
the undermining effect of rewards, to answer the behaviourists’ claim that 
undermining is merely a transitory effect. By comparing studies with different 
timings, the authors concluded that the timing of assessments after reward removal 
did not affect the results. This result confirms that undermining is a permanent effect 
after a temporary reward.  
On the other hand, the crowding out measured when an incentive is in place has a 
static connotation without any relation to time. The only assessment that can be made 
is that the crowding out will appear while the reward is in place, other things being 
equal, whereas the post-reward effects are not investigated. From this point of view, 
both reward and its effect are considered as permanent, simply because the effects of 
temporary policies are disregarded. It should be noted that, based only on 
psychological data, economics should predict only that an incentive would be 
counterproductive if it is removed, signalling the inefficiency of temporary incentives.  
 
3.2 Substitution and income effects 
In economics, different behaviours are associated with temporary and permanent 
shocks, if they are expected. Facing a shock that is felt as temporary, agents are 
induced to an inter-temporal substitution: they try to benefit from the temporary shock 
during its contingency, knowing that in the following period the beneficial effect will 
end. This could be the case of a reward whose supply will end with the experiment. If 
agents know (or perceive) that the reward is temporary, they will ‘use’  their 
motivation as much as possible during the reward supply to exploit the favourable 
period. They expect that in the future only intrinsic motivation will increase their 
utility, because the reward will disappear. The undermining effect can be interpreted 
as an intertemporal substitution effect: when facing a temporary reward, individuals 
choose more free choice activity when it is rewarded, reducing the future engagement 
in that activity. Compared with a no-reward situation, the undermining condition will 
exhibit a reduction in the free choice activity in the post reward removal period, 
whereas the unrewarded individual shows a constant level of activity and motivation. 
This explanation needs the assumption that agents can freely choose the intertemporal 
allocation of their intrinsic motivation, as occurs for consumption. Furthermore, it 
should be noted that the substitution effect is at work when the reward is expected or 
announced before or during the performance. This condition is supported by empirical 
psychological research showing that for unexpected rewards no detrimental effect is 
present.  
When the reward is perceived or announced as permanent, agents will choose actions 
that incorporate a never-ending reward. Agents leave the distribution of the free 
choice activity unchanged among different periods at a constant level, because each 
period is equally rewarded. The intertemporal effect predicted is only an income 
effect (no substitution takes place): individuals facing a reward that will last for each 
period feel richer. The income effect is associated with an increase in the good 
consumption (the free choice activity) if the good is a normal good, whereas the free 
choice activity is reduced if it is an inferior good. If the motivated activity is an 
inferior good, then the effort in that activity will be reduced during the reward supply, 
showing a crowding out situation. If the motivated activity is a normal good, the 
crowding in will appear. Note that the classical distinction between inferior and 
normal goods in economics is not a quality statement of different goods but concerns 
their different affordability. In the scarcity approach to individual choices, some 
goods are inferior simply because they are easily affordable with a low income. This 
explanation therefore needs the assumption that the free choice activity is a source of 
individual utility easily affordable at a low-income level. When income increases, 
individuals can consume a wider variety of goods and the consumption of the (inferior 
and generally low price) good decreases.   
If this distinction reflects the actual difference between economic and psychological 
results, the ‘undermining’ effect of post reward removal is produced by the ex ante 
perception of a temporary reward, which induces an intertemporal substitution in the 
choices related to the motivated activity. The ‘crowding-out’ effect is the 
consequence of a reward perceived as permanent, bringing an income effect that 
reduces the motivated activity if it is an inferior good. In a two periods framework, 
the ‘undermining’ is usually observed in the second period, whereas the claim for the 
existence of ‘crowding out’ concerns the first period. Note that, when the reward is 
temporary, in the first period both effects can be in place. With normal goods, the two 
effects would reinforce each other, enhancing the motivated activity both for a 
substitution and an income effect.  When the motivated activity is classified as an 
inferior good, the substitution effect will increase performance whereas the income 
effect will decrease it. Therefore, the net effect in the first period is ambiguous. 
 
4. Intrinsic motivations classification 
 
Some further differences between economics and psychology are in their definition of 
intrinsic motivation. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is 
based on the relation between motivation and the activity performed and/or the 
individual. Starting from the idea that motivation is a factor that activates and directs 
human behaviour, one can easily classify economic incentives in the category of 
extrinsic motivations, because they are exogenous both to the activity and to the 
individual.  
By comparison, any motivation that is endogenous to the individual and/or to his 
behaviour is intrinsic. When motivation is not provided by someone else, is 
formalised into a feeling and/or is strictly linked to the activity performed, it is 
intrinsic. The effect of the intrinsic motivation is easy to recognize when economic 
theory predicts a very different behaviour: volunteering with a zero wage is an 
example. Nevertheless, in many other cases it is difficult to ‘differentiate between 
different sources of motivation, which in the economic view are just manifestations of 
underlying preferences (for the task itself, or for the reward that is associated with 
performing the task)’ (Frey and Jegen, 2001, p.591), and between the two polar cases 
of purely extrinsically and purely intrinsically induced individuals there is a 
continuum of combination of the two motivations.  
To better explain how intrinsic and extrinsic motivations compete in behaviour 
orientation it is useful to consider the effect of more than one goal at a time, as 
suggested by Lindenberg (2001). The following classification of goals of human 
behaviour relevant for intrinsic motivation is from Meier and Stutzer (2008). Their 
original classification is extended in this paper with a fourth category (n. 2) to better 
include the Benabou and Tirole (2003) framework. These categories are considered 
relevant for economic studies: a brief discussion of the differences to psychological 
approaches will follow. 
1. Pleasure in performing the task. Strictly following the Deci definition, ‘to be 
intrinsically motivated means to engage in an activity because the activity 
itself is interesting and enjoyable’ (Deci et al. 2008, p. 11). Intrinsic 
motivation directs behaviour towards the pleasure of doing something and the 
opportunity to let one’s own competence increase. Being linked to individual 
preferences and to the activity, motivation is intrinsic both to the individual 
and to the activity. No one else is involved. 
2. Desire to succeed in performing the task. From the Benanbou and Tirole 
perspective, an ‘agent will undertake the task only if he has sufficient 
confidence in his own ability to succeed’ (Benabou and Tirole, 2003, p. 491). 
Intrinsic motivation is identified with the probability of success, which in turn 
depends on the agent’s self-confidence, his ability and the difficulty of the 
task. It is intrinsic both to the individual and to the activity. Through the 
‘looking glass self’, the probability of success could be reinforced or crowded 
out by a principal that, supplying an extrinsic motivation, provides 
information on personal ability and/or the difficulty of the task. The extrinsic 
motivation may be an explicit reward or a public acknowledgement.  
3. The warm glow. An impure form of altruism is what Andreoni (1990) defined 
the warm glow, to point out that people are often ‘motivated by a desire to win 
prestige, respect, friendship, and other social and psychological objectives’ 
(Olson, 1965). In this respect, motivation is a feeling that needs an ex post 
social approval to be reinforced. Though warm glow is provided by the 
surrounding society, it is intrinsic to the individual and could be intrinsic to 
the activity. 
4. Social preferences. Social preferences imply that an individual has as an 
objective not only his welfare but also other people’s welfare (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2002) and can be interpreted as a category of intrinsic 
motivation: individual choices are directed by an internal emotional goal that 
is related to the welfare of others. Motivation is intrinsic to the individual, for 
it is embedded in his preferences. It could be not intrinsic to the activity. 
Moving from category 1 to 4, one can observe an increasing social involvement of the 
individual, from pure individual gratification, to the need to be accepted at a social 
level, to the other regarding preferences.  
Some criticism can be expressed towards the category related to the “warm glow”, 
included by Meier and Stutzer as a kind of intrinsic motivation. Psychological 
research would classify this motivation as extrinsic because it involves “taking a 
regulation but not fully accepting it as one’s own” (Deci, Ryan 2000 p. 72). These 
introjected behaviours, in the words of Deci and Ryan, “although internally driven … 
are not really experienced as a part of the self” because they are directed to win 
prestige or friendship in the external environment and so would be better classified as 
extrinsically motivated.  
This criticism is relevant to an analysis of the model in Benabou and Tirole (2006), 
where the authors investigate pro social behaviour through a preference function 
including intrinsic, extrinsic and reputational motivations. The authors describe 
intrinsic motivation to behave pro-socially as stemming from two sources. The first is 
the pure form of altruism of an agent who “may care about the overall level of a 
public good to which his action contributes, such as air quality”. This part of intrinsic 
motivation can reflect a genuine interest in social welfare, but it is later also defined 
as “the marginal utility of a public good generated by total contribution” (p. 1670), 
which is the selfish agent’s marginal utility deriving from the total public good 
supply. The second is a ‘joy of giving’ (independent of social – or self esteem 
concerns) that makes him value his own contribution more than someone else’s, 
which they call impure altruism (p.1657).  If we exclude the impure altruism from the 
category of intrinsic motivation, the second component cannot be labelled as intrinsic 
motivation.  
The relevant point is that, in the model offered by Benabou ant Tirole, the first term 
becomes vanishingly small in large groups because it depends inversely on the size of 
the group. Consequently, the only intrinsic motivation that is eventually crowded out 
in the model is the “warm glow”, that is the desire to gain social approval.  
 
5. Motivations and rewards: an input and output classification 
 
Starting from the above categories, a new distinction among goals that are relevant for 
intrinsic motivation can be proposed, which could be especially useful for economic 
modelling, because it uses the classical distinction between input and output concepts. 
Intrinsic motivation is input oriented if it is not directed toward the output dimension 
of the activity. On the other hand, when the goal of intrinsic motivation is the output 
of the activity, the intrinsic motivation is output oriented. It is easy to show that in the 
first category the intrinsic motivation is not related to the output dimension of the 
activity, and the intrinsic motivation is input oriented. In the last three categories, the 
objective of intrinsic motivation is the output of the activity, rather than the activity 
itself, and the intrinsic motivation is output oriented. 
The distinction is also relevant because of the different role of self esteem and self 
determination mechanisms, which are referred to as relevant mechanisms in cognitive 
evaluation theory. Self determination is related to autonomy and competence of 
individual effort and affects the input dimension of intrinsic motivation. Self esteem 
arises from the comparison between results (real self) and expectations (ideal self) 
and affects the output dimension of intrinsic motivation. It plays a role only when the 
intrinsic motivation is output oriented, and is not relevant when an activity is engaged 
just for the pleasure of performing the activity itself and the agent doesn’t care about 
the results of his performance. Note that social psychologists and sociologists 
describe the two sources of intrinsic motivation more or less in a similar way. 
Galbraith (1977) and Staw (1989) consider intrinsic motivation as deriving from task 
involvement or goal identification.  
The input/output classification, implying traditional economic terminology, can be 
more easily reconciled with the psychological analysis and its classification of reward 
types. The coding proposed and reported in Deci et al (1999) can be summarised as 
follows. 
1. Task – noncontingent rewards do not require the person to engage in the target 
activity (e.g. rewards contingent on waiting or for being in the study);  
2. Engagement – contingent rewards require that some effort in a specific 
activity must be supplied in order to obtain the reward.  
3. Completion – contingent rewards are offered only when the task is completed. 
4. Performance – contingent rewards depend on the performance level the person 
exhibits in completing the task. 
The argument proposed in this paper to link the instruments for economic modelling 
to the psychological analysis is the following. The first two categories of rewards are 
linked to the input dimension of the participant, whereas the latter two categories are 
linked to the output dimension of the activity: the first with a discrete evaluation (yes 
or no), the second with a continuous measure (the quantity/quality level of 
performance). 
In economic modelling, it can be useful to compare the orientation of the motivation 
(input/output) described by a specific preference structure with the incentive policy 
designed by the principal. Different situations and equilibrium values emerge from 
each combination of preference and incentives. Simplifying, four different situations 
can arise from the combination of motivations and rewards: 
1. input oriented motivation and input related reward  
2. input oriented motivation and output related reward  
3. output oriented motivation and input related reward 
4. output oriented motivation and output related reward 
Intuitively, the mixed combinations with input (output) objectives and output (input) 
measures are not relevant, whereas the direct measure of the objective of motivation 
in the input/input and output/output combinations are candidates for undesired effects.  
Unfortunately, this intuition cannot be easily tested because it is difficult to discern if 
individuals are driven by input or output oriented motivations. Moreover, 
psychological literature finds undermining effects not only for output related rewards 
but also for the engagement-contingent rewards, an input related type of reward. 
 
6. Evidence in economics on crowding out 
 
To verify if economic analysis is based on evidence dealing with permanent rewards 
and income effects, a brief discussion of empirical tests in the economic field will be 
useful. The quantity of economic evidence on the crowding out is not comparable to 
the great bulk of empirical research that psychology has accumulated in the last thirty 
years. Some experimental and empirical studies support the crowding out of intrinsic 
motivation, through the observation of a reduction in performance induced by the 
introduction of a reward. All these studies measure the performance during the reward 
supply.  
Note that the simplest way to verify that a good is an inferior good is its relation with 
income: when income increases the consumption of an inferior good will decrease.  
Therefore, data arising from economic studies can be discussed in two different ways: 
a) when incentives are permanent, no undermining (substitution) effect takes 
place; if the objective of motivation is an inferior good, crowding out (income 
effect) can appear. Testing crowding out requires data on the same individual 
experiencing different levels of income (or reward); 
b) when incentives are temporary, an undermining (substitution effect) emerges 
in individuals observed before and after reward. A crowding out (income 
effect) can be tested when comparing individuals with different levels of 
rewards in the same period. 
A first set of experiments on motivation crowding out is in Gneezy and Rustichini 
(2000a). Comparing their analysis with the standard psychological studies, they state 
the difference between the two as follows: “We study the behavioural response to 
different rewards in a single - stage setup. The comparison is across individuals, not 
across successive periods for the same individual following the reward” (p. 795). It is 
worth noting that the meta-analysis by Deci et al. (1999) considers only the studies 
that had appropriate no-reward control groups. The comparisons exerted by 
psychological research are across individuals analysed across successive periods, 
whereas the experiments by Gneezy and Rustichini compare different individuals in 
one period. The psychological studies analyse the difference in behaviour between a 
reward group and a no-reward (control group), after reward removal, whereas the 
Gneezy and Rustichini experiments analyse the difference in behaviour between a 
reward group and a no-reward (control group), during the reward supply. This 
different set up is coherent with the different objective of analysis.  
The first experiment reported in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) involved a group of 
students paid to perform an IQ test. All groups of students were paid for participating 
in the test and three of the four groups had additional payments – with different 
rewards – for questions they answered correctly. Rewards are all announced before 
starting the test for each group. Following the rewards classification above, the 
control group experienced an engagement-contingent reward, whereas the others an 
additional performance-contingent reward.  Both kinds of reward were found to be 
undermining in the psychological literature (Deci et al., 1999), while in the Gneezy 
and Rustichini experiment the crowding out emerges only in the group with a very 
high performance pay, whereas the low paid group increased their performance, 
compared with the control group rewarded for the engagement.  
It is difficult to compare these results with the results from psychology because the 
control group would also be classified as a rewarded group by the psychological 
literature: it is a group that faces an engagement-contingent reward. Without a control 
group, it could not be argued that incentives undermine intrinsic motivation but only 
that different kind of incentive have different effects on performance. Moreover, in 
the light of the previous explanations, the rewards for the IQ test are transitory and 
can induce a substitution effect, but we cannot observe the behaviour after the reward 
removal. The crowding out of the high pay group supports the idea that the 
performance in the IQ test is an inferior good, whose consumption is reduced when 
income increases.  
In the second experiment in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a), students going out from 
house to house collecting monetary donations were divided in three groups: one 
control group with no reward beside a brief speech on the importance of the activity; 
two groups with different rewards, consisting of a percentage of the amount collected. 
In the meta-analysis in Deci et al. (1999), the verbal rewards (the brief speech in the 
experiment) can also be considered as (non-tangible) rewards, but were found to 
enhance intrinsic motivation and not be undermining. Therefore, simplifying the 
framework, the group receiving only the brief speech can be considered as a control 
group.  
The experiment results report that the tangible-rewarded groups exhibited worse 
performances than the control group (verbally rewarded) and that the high-rewarded 
group performed better than the low-rewarded group, but still worse than the control 
group, leading the authors to choose the title “Pay enough or don’t pay at all”. In the 
authors’ description, the donation experiment is based on an Israeli tradition where a 
few ‘donation days’ take place every year and students go from door to door to collect 
donations. The existence of a ‘tradition’ of door to door collecting is enough to 
confirm that the reward is temporary, because it is associated with that specific 
experiment and not with any ‘donation day’. Again, no information is available on the 
subsequent performances of students collecting donations and it is impossible to test 
the undermining effect of rewards. In line with the ‘inferior good hypothesis’, the 
comparison between the rewarded groups and the not rewarded group shows a 
crowding out, where the negative income effect of the rewards is greater than the 
positive substitution effect. When the two rewarded groups are compared, the 
substitution effect seems to prevail. It could be argued that the income effect is 
stronger when a previously unrewarded activity is paid than when subjects engaged in 
a rewarded activity receive a pay increase. It seems reasonable that agents consuming 
free activities drastically change their choices, by reducing the motivated activity, 
when other expensive goods become available through the payment gained. It is also 
reasonable that the reduction in free activity is smaller for further income growth 
when the expensive goods are still available. Further analyses are needed to support 
this intuition.    
A cross sectional analysis among individuals in the same period is also carried out in 
Frey and Goette (1999). The authors use an econometric approach to the volunteer 
labour supply to investigate the effect of compensations on the quantity of hours 
volunteered. They compare a control group (without rewards) and two rewarded 
groups of volunteers with different payments, finding that rewarded volunteers supply 
less hours than non rewarded volunteers. A standard problem in volunteering is that it 
is not easy to recognise if individuals are volunteers or low paid workers. Estimates 
do not include variables such as employment status or income, so it is impossible to 
discern if the rewarded volunteers are simply low paid workers. If they are low paid 
workers, the reward is the way to attract less motivated individuals and is probably a 
permanent compensation2.  
A different design is found in the Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) experiment on the 
willingness to accept a repository for radioactive waste in the hometown of 
respondents. The survey was conducted by posing a series of questions to the same 
sample of individuals. First they were asked if they would be willing to permit the 
construction of a nuclear waste repository. Secondly, they were asked whether they 
would be willing to accept the construction if the government had decided to 
compensate all residents with an annual monetary compensation. The percentage of 
acceptance of the repository when a reward was offered was lower than in the first 
question, when no reward was offered. In this study there was no control group, 
because the same individuals answered all the questions and it is difficult to assess the 
psychological effect of that specific sequence. Nevertheless, it is clear that the reward 
is offered permanently and that no inter-temporal substitution effect can be advocated. 
The undermining effect cannot be observed, whereas the crowding out could be the 
consequence of the permanent (expected) income increase, which reduces the 
consumption of the inferior good, in this specific experiment defined as civic duty. 
Other empirical/experimental tests often advocated as support for the motivation 
crowding theory concentrate on dependent variables that are further from the narrow 
definition of intrinsic motivation. Fehr and Gatcher (2000) and Bruni et al. (2009) test 
reciprocity, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) verify the persistence to norm adherence, 
Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) analyse other regarding preferences while Bohnet, 
Frey and Huck (2001) analyse trustworthiness. In the light of the previous 
classification of input/output oriented motivations, the latter studies concentrate on 
output oriented motivations, whereas the first studies discussed refer to input oriented 
motivations.  
                                                
2 A discussion on the difficulties to test intrinsic motivation in volunteering is in Bruno and Fiorillo 
(2012). 
This brief discussion of some widely cited tests of motivation crowding out shows 
that evidence from economics is not completely comparable to that found in the 
psychological literature. More evidence is needed to support the idea that crowding 
out occurs during the supply reward. In spite of the mixed evidence of empirical 
economic tests, there is some support for the idea that crowding out emerges because 
activity performed for intrinsic motives is an inferior good. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
The most important divergence between economic analyses and psychological 
research on intrinsic motivation emerges when the effects of expected rewards on 
individual performance are discussed. Most results from psychological research show 
undermining effects on intrinsic motivation after the reward removal, whereas during 
the reward supply a better performance can be found. Economics usually studies the 
effects of rewards during the reward supply, because of its interest in the well 
functioning of economic incentives, but evidence on crowding out of intrinsic 
motivation during the reward supply is still limited.  
If crowding out is confirmed by further tests, it could be reconciled with evidence on 
the undermining effects of rewards in psychological research when interpreted in an 
intertemporal choices framework. The reduced intrinsic motivation that emerges after 
the reward removal (undermining of intrinsic motivation) can be induced by an 
intertemporal substitution between two periods: in the first period, the agent exploits 
his intrinsic motivation in order to gain as much reward as he can, moving the 
motivated activity from the second to the first period. This substitution effect is the 
permanent effect of a reward that will be in place if the reward is offered temporarily. 
This explanation needs the assumption that agents can freely choose the intertemporal 
allocation of their intrinsic motivation, as occurs for consumption. 
On the other hand, intrinsic motivation can be crowded out by a reward, and the 
performance reduced during the reward supply, if the permanent reward is offered for 
an activity valued as an inferior good. Individuals who feel richer will decrease their 
consumption of inferior goods and increase their consumption of normal goods. The 
income effect will produce a decrease in the activity freely chosen for intrinsic 
motives if it is valued as an inferior good. This explanation needs the assumption that 
the free choice activity is a source of individual utility easily affordable at a low-
income level Discussion on the evidence on crowding out in economic science 
supports the idea that motivated activities can often be interpreted as inferior goods, 
whose consumption is reduced when income increases because a wider range of 
goods becomes available. 
More research is needed to empirically test the inferior good hypothesis with data on 
the same individual experiencing different levels of income (or reward), compared 
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